Allies are not bargaining chips: USA’s commitments in Asia must be non‑negotiable

Trump’s instinct to leverage alliances as bargaining tools against China undermines the very deterrence they are meant to provide. Alliances are not poker chips. They are the scaffolding of U.S. power and credibility in Asia.

The durability of America’s alliances in Asia has long been the bedrock of regional stability. Yet President Donald Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy risks reducing these alliances to bargaining chips in negotiations with Beijing. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines are not expendable assets; they are sovereign partners whose security guarantees form the architecture of the Indo-Pacific order. To treat them otherwise is to invite instability, embolden China, and erode U.S. credibility worldwide.

Since the end of World War II, U.S. alliances in Asia have been designed not merely as military arrangements but as political commitments. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security transformed Japan into a cornerstone of U.S. strategy, ensuring maritime stability in the Pacific. In South Korea, the 1953 Mutual Defence Treaty guaranteed deterrence against North Korea, while embedding Seoul in a broader U.S. security framework. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, though unofficial, codified America’s commitment to Taiwan’s defence and democratic survival. The 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty with Philippines secured America’s access to critical sea lanes in the South China Sea. These alliances were never conceived as transactional chips to be traded for concessions. They were strategic investments in a rules-based order.